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"Consistently, A Pivotal Role"
New York Times
July 2, 2005
Linda Greenhouse
The O'Connor Court.
The phrase has been used so many times
over so many years to describe the Supreme
Court that it is nearly a cliche. Yet the
simple words capture an equally simple
truth: to find out where the court is on
almost any given issue, look for Justice
Sandra Day O'Connor.
If you are a lawyer with a case at the court,
pitch your arguments to her. If your issue is
affirmative action, or religion, or federalism,
or redistricting, or abortion, or constitutional
due process in any of its many
manifestations, you can assume that the fate
of that issue is in her hands. Don't bother
with doctrinaire assertions and bright-line
rules. Be meticulously prepared on the
facts, and be ready to show how the law
relates to those facts and how, together, they
make sense.
And it is because Justice O'Connor has
played such a pivotal role on the court for
much of her 24-year tenure that her
unexpected retirement is such a galvanizing
event. Much more than the widely
anticipated retirement of the predictably
conservative Chief Justice William H.
Rehnquist, her departure creates an
opportunity for President Bush to shape the
court.
The last such defining moment occurred
with the retirement in 1987 of Justice Lewis
F. Powell Jr., whose position on the court
then resembled Justice O'Connor's today.
President Ronald Reagan nominated a
polarizing conservative, Robert H. Bork,
whose defeat by a Democratic-controlled
Senate after a protracted battle still resonates
today.
A list of the issues on which Justice
O'Connor has held the balance of power
goes far to explain why holiday weekend
preparations screeched to a halt in
Washington on Friday morning as word
spread of her decision to retire.
Just two years ago, she wrote the opinion for
the 5-to-4 majority that upheld affirmative
action in university admissions. Earlier, in a
series of decisions interpreting the
Constitution's guarantee of equal protection,
she led or joined 5-to-4 majorities that
viewed with great suspicion government
policies that took account of race in federal
contracting, employment and electoral
redistricting. Her view was that the
government should not be in the business of
counting by race.
But in Grutter v. Bollinger, the University of
Michigan case decided in 2003, she became
persuaded that affirmative action in
university admissions was still justified.
"Effective participation by members of all
racial and ethnic groups in the civic life of
our nation is essential if the dream of one
nation, indivisible, is to be realized," she
wrote.
Until the pair of Ten Commandments
decisions this week, which found her in
dissent from the ruling that upheld a Ten
Commandments monument on the grounds
of the Texas Capitol, she had occupied a
central position on the role of religion in
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public life.
Beginning with her earliest years on the
court, Justice O'Connor adopted her own test
for evaluating whether government policy
amounted to an unconstitutional
establishment of religion. Instead of a three-
part test that the court used, she asked
whether the government policy under review
conveyed to nonadherents the message that
they were "outsiders, not full members of
the political community."
This led her to vote to prohibit public prayer
at high school graduations and football
games, but to insist on equal access for
student religious publications and clubs. In
2002, she voted with the 5-to-4 majority that
upheld the use of publicly financed tuition
vouchers at religious schools. In her opinion
this week concurring with the 5-to-4
majority that declared framed copies of the
Ten Commandments hanging in Kentucky
courthouses to be unconstitutional, she said
the Constitution's religion clauses "protect
adherents of all religions, as well as those
who believe in no religion at all."
On the other most intensely fought social
issue of the day, abortion, Justice
O'Connor's successor will not be in a
position to move the court away from its
support of the core right to abortion, now at
6 to 3. But in the court's last major abortion
ruling, five years ago, Justice O'Connor
provided the crucial fifth vote to strike down
Nebraska's ban on what were called "partial
birth" abortions.
She has been a loyal ally of her Stanford
Law School classmate Chief Justice William
H. Rehnquist in the court's continuing
reappraisal of the relationship between the
states and the federal government, joining
the five-member majority in a series of cases
that have insisted on greater respect for the
sovereignty of the individual states while
limiting the role of Congress.
One of the few federalism cases in which
she and Justice Rehnquist parted company
came last year in Tennessee v. Lane, on
whether states were immune from being
sued for failing to make their courthouses
accessible to people with disabilities.
Justice O'Connor provided a fifth vote
against immunity, while Chief Justice
Rehnquist dissented. The plaintiff was a
man who used a wheelchair and who had
been forced to crawl up the stairs to reach
the courtroom in a Tennessee county
courthouse.
To the extent that Justice O'Connor had an
overall judicial philosophy, she might have
expressed it most directly in an opinion
dissenting from a 1995 decision that
authorized public school districts to subject
student athletes to drug testing without any
suspicion of individual wrongdoing. The
policy was justified to deal with rampant
student drug use, the district had argued in
Vernonia School District v. Acton.
In her dissenting opinion, Justice O'Connor
warned that judges should be wary of
overreacting to such arguments.
"Some crises are quite real" but some are
not, she said. "The only way for judges to
mediate these conflicting impulses is to do
what they should do anyway: stay close to
the record in each case that appears before
them, and make their judgments based on
that alone."
Sandra O'Connor's pragmatic approach to
life and the law was probably born in the
stark and isolated desert of the Southwest
that she described in vivid detail in Lazy B, a
childhood memoir she published three years
ago. The Day family ranch, 250 arid square
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miles straddling the Arizona-New Mexico
border, "was no country for sissies," she
wrote.
The house, 35 miles from the nearest town,
had neither electricity nor running water.
Her companions were horses and ranch
hands, and her goal as the first-born child
was to be useful around the place and to
please her hard-driving, perfectionist father.
When things broke, they needed to be fixed.
There was little room for discussion and
none for theorizing.
Fulfilling her father's own ambition that had
been thwarted by the lack of money, she
attended Stanford University and Stanford
Law School, where she graduated third in
the class of 1952 at the age of 22. The top
honors in the class went to a World War II
veteran more than five years her senior,
William H. Rehnquist. He went on to a
Supreme Court clerkship. As a woman, she
could not get a job with the law firms to
which she applied, receiving offers of
secretarial jobs instead.
She turned to the public sector as a lawyer
for state and local governments, while
raising three sons with her husband, John,
who had been a fellow law-review editor at
Stanford. The couple settled in Phoenix,
where civic activities led her to a career in
Republican politics. The Arizona governor
appointed her to a vacant seat in the State
Senate in 1969, and she later twice won
election. She became majority leader, the
first woman in the country to hold such a
high leadership position in a state
legislature.
In 1974, she was elected to a seat on the
state trial court. Five years later, Gov.
Bruce Babbitt, a Democrat, appointed her to
the state appeals court, where she was
serving when President Reagan, who had
promised to appoint a woman to the
Supreme Court, chose her in July 1981 for
the first vacancy to occur during his term.
She was confirmed unanimously, forever to
be known as the first woman on the
Supreme Court, or F.W.O.T.S.C., as she has
put it dryly.
Although hardly a feminist in terms of
political activism, Justice O'Connor
demonstrated from her earliest years on the
court a sensitivity to issues of sex
discrimination that she maintained
throughout her tenure.
One of her first majority opinions, in 1982,
came in Mississippi University for Women v.
Hogan. The 5-to-4 decision declared
unconstitutional the exclusion of a male
applicant from a state-supported, women-
only nursing school. Her opinion warned
against using "archaic and stereotypic
notions" about proper roles for men and
women.
On several occasions, including this year,
she joined the four more liberal justices to
uphold a broad interpretation of a federal
statute addressing sex discrimination. In
1999, for example, she wrote the opinion for
a 5-to-4 majority in Davis v. Monroe County
Board of Education, holding public school
districts accountable for one student's sexual
harassment of another student.
And during the term that just ended, she
wrote the majority opinion in another 5-to-4
decision, Jackson v. Birmingham Board of
Education, that expanded the scope of the
sex discrimination law known as Title IX to
provide protection against retaliation for
whistle-blowers who complain about
discriminatory practices in schools and
colleges.
One exception came in 2000, when she
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joined Chief Justice Rehnquist's 5-to-4
majority opinion in United States v.
Morrison, invalidating a provision of the
Violence Against Women Act on the ground
that Congress had lacked the constitutional
authority to enact the law.
The most famous, or notorious, 5-to-4
opinion in 2000 was, of course, Bush v.
Gore, which ended the Florida recount and
effectively called the presidential election
for George W. Bush. Justice O'Connor
joined the unsigned opinion that declared the
conditions of the recount to violate the
constitutional guarantee of equal protection.
While Mr. Bush was undoubtedly pleased
by that decision, he was just as undoubtedly
displeased last year when the court refused
to accept his administration's position that
the federal courts lacked jurisdiction to hear
challenges to the open-ended detention of
those being held both at the United States
naval base at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, and in
military custody in the United States.
"A state of war is not a blank check for the
president," Justice O'Connor wrote for the
court in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld She said
"history and common sense teach us that an
unchecked system of detention carries the
potential to become a means for oppression
and abuse of others." In a second case
decided at the same day last June, Rasul v.
Bush, she joined the majority opinion
extending federal jurisdiction to the
Guantanamo detainees.
During the term that ended on Monday,
Justice O'Connor was on the losing side in
two major cases: Kelo v. City of New
London, which upheld governmental power
to use eminent domain for economic
development, and Gonzales v. Raich,
upholding the federal government's power to
enforce federal drug laws in states that
permit marijuana to be used for medical
purposes.
Justice O'Connor learned she had breast
cancer early in the court's 1988 term and
underwent a mastectomy and follow-up
treatment. She never missed a day that the
court was on the bench, and only years later
did she reveal publicly, in a talk to other
cancer survivors, how stressful the period
had been. She also bounced back quickly
from an emergency appendectomy.
In recent years, she has maintained an active
schedule of public speaking and foreign
travel, in addition to writing two books. It
was her husband's deteriorating health, not
her own brushes with illness, that finally
wore down a woman who still proudly refers
to herself as a cowgirl.
"She has taught us all," her friend and
colleague Stephen G. Breyer said Friday in a
statement released by the court.
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"O'Connor Not Confined by Conservatism"
USA Today
June 24, 2004
Joan Biskupic
She is an enduring part of Ronald Reagan's
legacy, the first woman justice on the U.S.
Supreme Court. But for years, Sandra Day
O'Connor has confounded many of the
conservatives for whom the late president is
an icon.
On a divided, nine-member court, O'Connor
is a conservative with an asterisk: a
pragmatic jurist who, when she sees fit, will
vote with the four liberal justices.
Particularly galling to some conservative
Republicans has been O'Connor's retreat
from initial stands against abortion rights
and some affirmative action policies.
Lately, the 23-year veteran of the high court
has been giving such critics more reasons to
gripe. Although O'Connor usually votes
with the court's conservative wing, she
increasingly has sided with the liberals in
significant cases that have been decided by
5-4 votes. It's led some conservative
observers of the court to wonder whether
O'Connor, at 74, is turning more to the left.
In May, she broke with her conservative
brethren to cast a decisive vote to let
disabled people sue states for access to
courthouses. Earlier this term, she joined
the court's liberals-John Paul Stevens,
David Souter, Ruth Bader Ginsburg and
Stephen Breyer-to preserve key parts of
the McCain-Feingold campaign-finance
limits, which ban unlimited donations from
corporations and unions to national political
parties.
She also joined the liberals in 5-4 rulings
that enhanced the U.S. government's power
to enforce the Clean Air Act on states, and
that allowed taxpayers to sue states to
challenge tax credits that benefit religious
schools.
That all followed a landmark ruling last
summer, when O'Connor's opinion upheld
the use of affirmative action in college
admissions.
Many legal analysts see such votes by
O'Connor as signs of her tendency to view
each case along narrow legal lines. But
some conservatives say she seems to be
enticed more by the left, and that unlike
Souter-an appointee of the first President
Bush who has become a consistent vote for
the liberal wing-they never know when
O'Connor will be with them or against them.
Reagan would be disappointed
With several major rulings due in the next
week as the high court wraps up this term-
including key tests of the Bush
administration's legal strategies in dealing
with suspected terrorists-O'Connor is
being viewed warily by some supporters of
the administration.
"Reagan would be disappointed in her recent
rulings," says Charles Cooper, a Washington
lawyer who was an assistant U.S. attorney
general under Reagan. "It is difficult to
reconcile some of her recent cases and
things she said in the past."
So is O'Connor really showing signs of
latent liberalism after nearly a quarter-
century on the nation's highest court?
39
A closer look at O'Connor's recent
decisions-and at others throughout her
tenure-suggests that she often is driven not
by ideology, but by general pragmatism and
life experiences that are atypical among the
current justices.
She was a rancher's daughter who was
taught the virtues of rugged individualism; a
woman lawyer who had trouble finding
work in a profession dominated by men; an
elected Arizona legislator familiar with the
relationship between money and politics,
and a state trial judge who sees access to
courts as fundamental.
Several of O'Connor's recent votes seemed
to reflect those experiences, particularly as
the only current justice who has raised
campaign money and run for public office.
During the past six months, O'Connor was
the only justice who was in the majority to
uphold the new campaign-finance law (a
move that infuriated conservatives) and in
the majority to prevent voting rights lawsuits
against partisan gerrymanders (a move that
irritated liberals).
"Perhaps I am swayed by my own
experience as a legislator," she said in a note
to a fellow justice when the court first
reviewed partisan gerrymanders in 1986,
and she urged her colleagues to leave them
alone. Such oddly shaped congressional
districts, drawn by the party controlling a
statehouse to favor its candidates, have
become more common in recent years as
parties have used computer programs to
reshape districts.
"There is no question that she has a
distinctive world orientation from the other
justices," says Cardozo Law School
professor Marci Hamilton, a former law
clerk to O'Connor. "But it's more than that.
She is the anti-ideologue. She will never let
theory trump reality."
Other legal analysts say O'Connor has
resisted taking positions that she believes
most Americans would not accept-most
notably on abortion.
"This is a justice who is tempted by
analytical consistency," says David Garrow,
a law professor at Emory University in
Atlanta. "But when analytical consistency
seems to be carrying her to an outcome that
would draw widespread denunciation, she
draws back."
Overall, O'Connor votes most often with
Chief Justice William Rehnquist (80% of the
time during the past four years), and least
often with senior liberal Justice John Paul
Stevens (58% of the time during the same
period).
In most 5-4 rulings, O'Connor votes with the
court's conservatives-Rehnquist, Antonin
Scalia, Anthony Kennedy and Clarence
Thomas. But the percentage of 5-4 rulings
in which O'Connor has joined the liberals
has risen in recent years, from 5.6% in the
1999-2000 term to 28.6% in 2002-2003.
To many Americans, O'Connor is a symbol
of women's rights because of her historic
ascension to the court. Among Republicans
she forever will be linked to Reagan, who in
1981 fulfilled a campaign promise when he
tapped her as the first woman justice.
Today, her stature is such that few in the
GOP dare to openly criticize her.
At the former president's funeral June 11,
O'Connor, as Reagan requested, read part of
the 1630 sermon by Massachusetts Puritan
John Winthrop expressing the ideals of a
"city on a hill."
Immediately afterward she flew to Phoenix,
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where she received a "distinguished career"
award that night from the State Bar of
Arizona. Looking out at the crowd of 350
who had paid $ 150 a plate to attend a dinner
saluting her, O'Connor praised Reagan for
"opening countless doors to women."
Early lessons in Arizona
O'Connor grew up on a ranch on the
Arizona-New Mexico border, the daughter
of a man who preached individual initiative
and resented the New Deal welfare of
Democrat Franklin D. Roosevelt. When she
became a judge, she would show a similar
distaste for the U.S. government's
intervention in local affairs and would
emphasize states' rights, a frequent theme on
today's Supreme Court.
At age 16 in 1946, she entered Stanford
University, where, she has said, she thrived
and became interested in notions of
community and the power of the law.
But O'Connor has said that when she
graduated from law school in 1952 she was
rejected by every law firm to which she
applied. One firm offered her a job as a
legal secretary-"depending on my typing,"
O'Connor recalled at the Phoenix dinner.
She declined it.
O'Connor wound up working in a county
attorney's office. She eventually returned to
Arizona and quickly rose through the ranks
of state politics.
A Republican loyalist, O'Connor worked on
Barry Goldwater's Senate re-election bid in
1958, passing out bumper stickers and
stuffing envelopes. In 1972, she was an
Arizona co-chairman of Richard Nixon's
presidential re-election campaign.
From 1969-1975, she was a state senator.
For two of those years, she was Senate
majority leader, the first woman to hold such
a post in the nation. Under the copper dome
of Arizona's capitol, O'Connor learned to
maneuver for her legislative priorities and to
build consensus experience that now
seems to help her negotiate with justices
who are more conservative or more liberal
than she is.
During her first several years on the
Supreme Court, O'Connor regularly lined up
with fellow conservatives Warren Burger
(who was then the chief justice) and
Rehnquist, a classmate of O'Connor's from
Stanford who became the chief after Burger
retired in 1986.
But even in her first term, she broke from
the right in a major case involving a
Mississippi man who had been rejected by a
state-run nursing school.
O'Connor cast the fifth vote in favor of Joe
Hogan, who claimed that the state-run
school violated the Constitution's guarantee
of equal protection under the law by
excluding men. In the opinion she wrote for
the court, she said excluding men from nurse
training "tends to perpetuate the stereotyped
view of nursing as an exclusively women's
job."
Her move away from conservatives on
abortion was gradual.
In opinions in 1983 and 1986, she said the
legal rationale of Roe vs. Wade, the 1973
ruling that made abortion legal nationwide,
was "unworkable." In dissenting opinions
with other conservatives, she backed state
abortion limits.
But in 1989, O'Connor appeared to have
misgivings about where the court-with the
addition of more conservative jurists-was
headed on abortion, and she softened her
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criticism of Roe. In 1992, she voted to
uphold a woman's right to end a pregnancy
and emphasized, in an opinion with
Kennedy and Souter, how long women had
relied on the Roe ruling.
Embracing affirmative action
A case last June that challenged racial
preferences in college admissions played to
O'Connor's experience as a young lawyer
and her willingness to back away from a
legal principle for pragmatic reasons,
Before the University of Michigan case,
O'Connor generally had opposed
government policies that favored minorities
because of their race.
But arguments about the value of diversity
in education won O'Connor's vote in the
Michigan dispute, and she joined the
majority in a 5-4 ruling in favor of
affirmative action. The justice who has said
she felt poorly prepared for college but then
blossomed at Stanford wrote that the "path
to leadership" offered by education must be
open to all qualified students.
Last December, O'Connor again was the
fifth vote, joining the liberals to uphold the
campaign-finance overhaul named for Sens.
John McCain, R-Ariz., and Russ Feingold,
D-Wis. The law banned unregulated
contributions from corporations and labor
groups to political parties, and restricted
political ads on TV.
The opinion she wrote with Stevens
acknowledged that "money, like water, will
always find an outlet" to influence politics.
It also emphasized deference to elected
lawmakers.
Last month, O'Connor was back with the
court's liberal wing as she broke with her
usual pattern of protecting states from
lawsuits based on federal civil rights laws.
In a case brought by a man in a wheelchair
who had to crawl up courthouse steps to get
to a hearing, the court voted 5-4 to allow
people to sue states under the Americans
with Disabilities Act for access to
courthouses.
O'Connor is familiar with the gritty side of
local courts. She first donned a black robe
for trials in a dingy Phoenix courtroom
where she kept a can of bug spray to fight
off cockroaches. In the ADA case, she
joined an opinion by Stevens that stressed
the importance of allowing people to
participate in the judicial process.
Todd Gaziano, legal director of the
conservative Heritage Foundation and a
former Reagan administration lawyer, says
O'Connor's vote in the disability case
undermined earlier decisions in which she
joined the court's conservatives. He says
she deviated from rulings that set a high
standard for when federal civil rights laws
should be imposed on the states.
"She's certainly a disappointment"
conservatives, he says.
to
Gaziano says his group is eager to see how
O'Connor votes in the upcoming cases that
test parts of Bush's terrorism strategy.
The cases will determine whether suspected
foreign terrorists held in Cuba should have
access to U.S. courts, and whether the
administration can lock up U.S. citizens
indefinitely, without charges or a hearing.
O'Connor's decisions in those cases,
Gaziano says, "will probably be more
telling."
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"Which Important Precedents Are Likely to Be in Jeopardy?"
SCOTUSblog
July 1, 2005
Marty Lederman
These are among the cases in which Justice
O'Connor's has been the decisive vote or
opinion, and in which a more conservative
Justice might well vote to overrule the
governing precedent. (The most significant
constitutional or quasi-constitutional rulings
are in boldface.) From anong these, I
believe that the President's nomination has
the potential to have the most significant
impact on issues relating to the
Establishment Clause and campaign
financing. Obviously, some of the
precedents in the abortion, affirmative action
and takings areas might also be implicated
in a dramatic way; but on these issues, it
might take a longer while for the Court to
have before it the proper vehicles for serious
reconsideration....
Caveat: The Court does not blithely
overrule numerous precedents every time
there is a change in membership (even when
the change is the replacement of a "pivotal"
Justice such as Justice O'Connor)-such
changes are usually accomplished gradually,
by accretion. Moreover, it is possible that
the new Justice will be more "liberal" than
Justice O'Connor in certain contexts, which
could also lead to the overruling of some of
the many 5-4 precedents in which Justice
O'Connor has voted with the more
conservative wing of the Court.
Note also: Because most Justices consider
stare decisis a more serious obstacle in cases
of statutory construction, those cases (e.g.,
the Davis and Jackson Title IX decisions)
might be more secure, even if Justice
O'Connor's replacement would not have
agreed with her as a matter of first
impression.
McCreary County v. ACLU
Commandments displays
(2005)-Ten
Jackson v. Birmingham Board of Educ
(2005)-Title IX Liability for Retaliation
Rompilla v. Beard (2005)-standard of
reasonable competence that Sixth
Amendment requires on the part of defense
counsel
Johanns v. Livestock Marketing (2005)-
assessments for government speech
Smith v. Massachusetts (2005)-double
jeopardy
Small v. United States (2005)-felon firearm
possession ban doesn't cover foreign
convictions
Tennessee v. Lane (2004 Congress's
Section 5 power
Hibbs v. Winn (2004)-Tax Injunction Act
Alaska Department of Environmental
Conservation v. EPA (2004)-EPA
authority under Clean Air Act to issue
orders when a state conservation agency
fails to act
McConnell v. FEC (2 0 0 4 )-campaign
finance
Groh v. Ramirez (2 0 0 4)-sufficiency of
non-particularized search warrant
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Grutter v. Bollinger (2003)-affirm ative
action
Brown v. Legal Foundation of Washington
(2003)-no takings violation in IOLTA
funding scheme
American Insurance Ass'n v. Garamendi
(2003)-presidential foreign-affairs "pre-
emption" of state law
Stogner v. California (2003)-ex post facto
clause as applied to changes in statutes of
limitations
Alabama v. Shelton (2002 right to counsel
Rush Prudential HMO v. Moran (2002)-
upholding state laws giving patients the right
to second doctor's opinion over HMOs'
objections
Kelly v. South Carolina (2002)-capital
defendant's due process right to inform jury
of his parole ineligibility
FEC v. Colorado Republican Federal
Campaign Committee (2001 )-upholding
limits on "coordinated" political party
expenditures
Zadvydas v. Davis (2001 )-prohibiting
indefinite detention of. immigrants under
final orders of removal where no other
country will accept them
Easley v. Cromartie (2001)-race-based
redistricting
Rogers v. Tennessee (2001)-"judicial" ex
post facto
Brentwood Academy v.
Secondary School Athletic
(2001)-state action
Tennessee
Association
Stenberg v. Carhart (2000 "partial-birth
abortion" ban
Mitchell v. Helms (1999)-direct aid to
religious schools
Davis v. Monroe County Board of Educ.
(1999)-recognizing school district liability
under Title IX for student-on-student sexual
harrassment
Schenck v. Pro-Choice Network (1997)
injunctions against abortion-clinic protestors
Richardson v. McKnight (1997}-private
prison guards not entitled to qualified
immunity in section 1983 suits
Camps Newfound/Owatonna v. Town of
Harrison (1997)-"dormant" Commerce
Clause as applied to nonprofit camps
Morse v. Republican Party of Virginia
(1996)-provisions of the Voting Rights Act
are constitutional as applied to choice of
candidates at party political conventions
Schlup v. Delo (1995}-habeas, actual
innocence
UPDATE:
As Professor Doug Berman notes, Justice
O'Connor also provided the crucial fifth vote
in two cases creating exceptions to the
Apprendi/Blakely doctrine: Almedarez-
Torres (prior convictions) and Harris
(mandatory minimum). She's also the fifth
vote for Justice Breyer's governing remedial
opinion in Booker/Fanfan-a vote that
might have enormous practical
consequences as future questions of
application arise.
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"The Power of Unpredictability: Justice Sandra Day O'Connor's
Numerous 'Swing-Vote' Decisions Have Kept
U.S. Supreme Court Watchers Guessing"
Los Angeles Times
December 1, 2003
Dahlia Lithwick
Saying that Sandra Day O'Connor represents
the perennial "swing vote" on the United
States Supreme Court is a legal truism. The
term is invoked constantly-watch for it
later this month as the court hands down its
decision testing aspects of the McCain-
Feingold campaign finance rules.
Is the presence of a "swing voter" a good
thing for the court or the law? Or is it
dangerous, as some critics suggest?
O'Connor is often described as the most
powerful woman in the country. Is it true?
Political theorists have long struggled to
craft an empirical description of the "swing
justice," but ultimately they can only agree
that-to paraphrase Justice Potter Stewart,
another notorious swing voter-we simply
know one when we see one. And what we
see in O'Connor is a justice who moves back
and forth between two more or less
established liberal and conservative blocs.
When the court is fairly evenly divided, a
justice such as O'Connor can easily be seen
as controlling its direction.
In the 2002-2003 term, the high court
decided nearly 20% of its cases by a 5-4
margin. In 12 of those 14 cases, O'Connor
was in the majority. A good illustration of
the way she "swings": her vote upholding
the affirmative action program at the
University of Michigan law school while she
simultaneously invalidated as
unconstitutional the school's undergraduate
program. She aligned herself with the
court's liberal bloc to decide the former case
and with the conservatives to decide the
latter.
O'Connor comes by her lightning-rod status
fairly, given that her unpredictability often
surfaces in the court's highest profile
cases-the ones that cut to core American
tensions: race, religion, sexuality and crime.
Over the years, her lone vote has meant the
survival of affirmative action and abortion
despite her conservative leanings. But it has
also led to the erosion of the wall between
church and state and the resurgence of state's
rights, whittling away at the Warren court's
liberal revolution.
Following her votes enshrining the
constitutionality of affirmative action and
striking down Texas' anti-homosexual
sodomy law last term, and despite her tough-
as-nails upholding of California's "three
strikes" law, conservative critics spent the
summer denouncing her as a monarch while
liberals rejoiced in the thought that beneath
her starchy exterior beats the heart of a
hippie.
But it's not just her high-profile role in high-
profile cases that creates controversy around
O'Connor's votes. She (and to a lesser
degree, her colleague Justice Anthony
Kennedy-the court's less swingy "swing
justice") often comes under attack because
unpredictability seems like a bad quality in
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interpreting the law.
If O'Connor and Kennedy aren't anchored in
any ideological or jurisprudential doctrine,
aren't they simply careening from belief to
belief, like weathervanes in black robes?
The real fear about O'Connor and Kennedy,
then, is that they are either deciding cases
based on what they ate for breakfast or, even
worse in critics' eyes, based on law review
articles, the theories of elite Ivy League
professors or public opinion polls.
It is, of course, impossible to cite any
evidence that O'Connor is actually swayed
by such externalities. No one has caught her
flipping coins in chambers, and it's unlikely
anyone ever will. On the other hand, there
is evidence-in some of her more
controversial opinions and in her latest
book, The Majesty of the Law-to suggest
that O'Connor worries, perhaps more so than
some of her colleagues, about the role of the
court in history and about its continued
legitimacy in the public mind. She has
stubbornly refused to overturn some
precedents with which she personally
disagrees, showing a higher regard for stare
decisis (the notion that from court to court
there needs to be consistency in judgments)
than ideology.
Overall, unpredictability does confer power
on O'Connor. But if she is indeed the most
powerful woman in the country, it's because
of another characteristic that is alarming to
her critics: the narrowness of her opinions.
As a result of her crabbed, case-by-case
approach, whatever new law comes from an
O'Connor decision may not apply in future
cases unless-improbably-the future facts
are identical.
She has thus become the lone architect of
entire new legal structures-of O'Connor
"sniff tests" for when abortion regulations
are permissible (no "undue burden" on the
pregnant woman); when gerrymanders of
voting districts are constitutional (if they are
not "bizarre") or when affirmative action
programs in college are legal (if they foster
"diversity"). O'Connor is willing to sacrifice
future clarity in legal doctrine for future
flexibility. And when she's the all-important
"fifth" vote, the rest of the court has no
choice but to go along for that ride.
Of course, O'Connor isn't the only important
swing voter in history. Before her, Justice
Lewis Powell was viewed as the perennial
moderate, even when O'Connor sat on the
court with him. And after his retirement,
Powell wasn't derided as a capricious
monarch. He was widely feted as a free
thinker and balancer on an otherwise
polarized court. Court watchers celebrated
his ability to get beyond liberal and
conservative dogma to arrive at equitable if
unpredictable results.
Whether O'Connor will similarly be viewed
someday as having brought a kind of
equilibrium to the court or simply as having
wrenched it into her own image is for
history to decide. O'Connor doubtless likes
it that way.
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"O'Connor Leap Moved Women Up the Bench"
New York Times
July 5, 2005
Adam Liptak
When President Ronald Reagan decided to
nominate Sandra Day O'Connor as the first
woman ever to the Supreme Court in 1981,
he did not have a lot of other women to
choose from. The bench, one might say,
was not deep.
"The pool of well-credentialed women
lawyers was minuscule at the time," said
Patrick J. Schiltz, a law professor at the
University of St. Thomas in Minneapolis
who served as a law clerk for Justice
Antonin Scalia. "They had to reach for
O'Connor. She wasn't even on the high
court in Arizona. She was on a middle-level
appellate court. Has there been another
nominee to the Supreme Court from a
midlevel state appeals court?"
The answer, it seems, is no. "You would be
very hard pressed to find anyone in the
history of the court who was elevated from
that role," said Kermit L. Hall, the president
of the State University of New York at
Albany and the editor of The Oxfbrd
Companion to the Supreme Court of the
United States. "It speaks volumes to the
presence of women on the bench at that
time. O'Connor really opened up a set of
opportunities that really would not have
existed without her."
A look at the courts shows the breadth of
change across the quarter of a century
bookmarked by Justice O'Connor's
nomination and her retirement. In 1981, Mr.
Reagan's first year in office, there were
almost 700 active federal judges, and 48
were women, some of them semiretired.
Today, according to the Federal Judicial
Center, there are 201 women and 622 men
among active federal judges. As late as the
beginning of the administration of Jimmy
Carter in 1977, there were fewer than 10
women on the federal bench, according to
the administrative office of the federal
courts.
Roberta C. Ramo, who became the first
woman to be president of the American Bar
Association in 1995, recalls what a
breakthrough the O'Connor nomination was
in 1981.
"It makes me tear up right now just to think
about it," Ms. Ramo said. "She was a
woman who had led a life that included
having children, stopped practicing for a
while, suffered discrimination, was a
legislator, was a judge. That was terribly
meaningful."
Justice O'Connor, who had served as a trial
judge for five years in Phoenix and then for
less than two years on the state court of
appeals, one step down from the Arizona
Supreme Court, made her way at a time
when women who were lawyers were often
lucky to get job offers, much less judicial
appointments.
Eleanor Smeal, who was the president of the
National Organization for Women in 1981,
said the O'Connor nomination was a turning
point.
"At that time women were a very teeny
percentage of judges," Ms. Smeal said. "We
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were begging male judges to give us our
rights, and we wanted someone on the
inside."
The first woman to serve on the federal
bench was Florence Ellinwood Allen,
appointed to the federal appeals court in
Cincinnati by Franklin D. Roosevelt in
1934. Harry S. Truman appointed the first
woman to be a federal trial judge, Burnita
Shelton Matthew, in 1949.
Because of Justice O'Connor's conservative
reputation on certain issues, some women's
groups were wary of her at the outset,
fearful that she would oppose legal
protections for abortion and interpret federal
laws addressing sex discrimination
narrowly. But her rulings in those areas
have generally found approval with women's
groups.
That is not to say women who are judges are
more likely to side with women who appear
before them than men are, said Cass R.
Sunstein, a law professor at the University
of Chicago who has studied judges' voting
patterns.
In sex discrimination and sexual
harassment cases," Mr. Sunstein said,
"women judges are no more sympathetic to
female plaintiffs than men judges. But
Democratic appointees are more
sympathetic to female plaintiffs than
Republican appointees."
Justice O'Connor was one of 5 women in a
class of 102 students who graduated from
Stanford Law School in 1952, at a time
when tuition was $220, said Catherine
Nardone, an associate dean there. The class
of 2007 has 71 women and 95 men, and they
pay more than $35,000 a year.
In 1981, according to the American Bar
Association, 36 percent of law school
students were women. Last year, it was 48
percent.
But the change in law schools is not
reflected in the upper ranks of the big law
firms, said Larry Kramer, the dean of
Stanford Law School. "In the profession,"
Mr. Kramer said, "this is definitely still an
issue. Partnerships in law firms haven't kept
pace."
About 16 percent of law firm partners are
women, according to a 2003 bar association
report.
That represents substantial progress. Justice
O'Connor was refused a job at every law
firm to which she applied and was offered
secretarial jobs instead, even though she had
graduated near the top of her class.
There is much room for improvement on
law school faculties, too, Mr. Kramer said.
Of 43 law professors at Stanford, 13 are
women.
In all, said Deborah Rhode, a law professor
at Stanford, "Women's representation in
status, income and security have increased,
but they're still overrepresented at the
bottom and underrepresented at the top."
Justice O'Connor's successor will face legal
issues of grave concern to women, but most
of the ones likely to reach the court soon
will be incremental. The core right to
abortion, supported by six of the current
justices, appears secure in the short term,
although the constitutionality of various
restrictions is likely to arise. The court will
also continue to shape the contours of laws
prohibiting sex discrimination, including
one concerning discriminatory practices in
school athletic programs.
Justice O'Connor's unexpected resignation
has upended the conventional wisdom about
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the relevant criteria for the next nominee.
There had been much talk of racial and
ethnic diversity and almost none concerning
the implications of candidates' gender. That
has changed.
"Until the middle of last week, when the
White House started hearing rumors that
Justice O'Connor would resign," said
Thomas C. Goldstein, who argues frequently
before the court and is an authority on it,
"every name on the short list was a boy.
Every name on the long list was a boy."
Ms. Smeal, now the president of the
Feminist Majority Foundation, a women's
rights group, said the question should not be
whether Justice O'Connor's seat ought to be
filled by a woman but why half of the nine
justices are not women. The other woman
on the court is Ruth Bader Ginsburg, who
was appointed by Bill Clinton. "We're
asking for another woman," Ms. Smeal said.
"We should have at least four. We should
not be allowed to go back to one. The era of
tokenism is over."
Although the pool of female judges is much
larger today than it was in 1981, the relevant
group remains small.
"The number of prominent conservative
Republican female federal appellate judges,"
Professor Schiltz said, "gets to be a very,
very small pool."
The women most frequently mentioned as
being considered for Justice O'Connor's seat
all sit on federal appeals courts. They
include Judges Edith Brown Clement, Edith
H. Jones and Priscilla R. Owen, all of the
United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit, in New Orleans, and Judge Janice
Rogers Brown of the United States Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit.
There has been no serious talk, this time, of
the need to scour the state lower courts to
find a woman suitable for the nation's
highest court.
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"How O'Connor and the Court Have Drifted Leftward"
National Journal
July 1, 2005
Stuart Taylor, Jr.
On June 27, as the Supreme Court ended its
term amid rampant speculation about 80-
year-old Chief Justice William Rehnquist's
future, his 75-year-old colleague Sandra Day
O'Connor was continuing to inch away from
her "conservative" past.
In one of the two Janus-faced decisions on
the Ten Commandments, the Reagan-
appointed O'Connor positioned herself to the
left of Clinton-appointed Justice Stephen
Breyer. She voted (in dissent) to order
removal of a Ten Commandments
monument in Texas that he voted to save.
Breyer wrote that court-ordered removal
"would, I fear, lead the law to exhibit a
hostility toward religion that has no place in
our Establishment Clause traditions."
It was unusual to see Breyer associating
O'Connor (among others) with hostility
toward religion. But it has become
increasingly common over the past two
decades to see the woman who was once
routinely (if misleadingly) labeled a member
of the Court's conservative bloc siding with
its four most liberal members. She has
tipped many a 5-4 decision in their direction,
including three big ones this year: the other
Ten Commandments case; a decision
expanding educational institutions' liability
for sex discrimination; and one overturning
a death sentence because of blunders by the
defense lawyer.
O'Connor's leftward drift helps account for
the supposedly conservative Rehnquist
Court's surprisingly liberal trend in recent
years. So do the similar evolutions of
Anthony Kennedy, another Reagan
appointee, and John Paul Stevens, a once-
moderate Ford appointee who is now the
leader of the Court's liberal bloc. Not to
mention the emergence of David Souter as a
liberal soon after his appointment by the
first President Bush. Kennedy or O'Connor
(or both) often leave conservatives gnashing
their teeth, by allying with Stevens, Souter,
Breyer, and Ruth Bader Ginsburg, the only
other Democratic (Clinton) appointee,
against Rehnquist, Antonin Scalia, and
Clarence Thomas.
This pattern explains the near-desperation
with which conservative groups are urging
the current President Bush to fill any
vacancies with proven, principled,
passionate conservatives. For better or
worse (or some of each, as I see it), for
complex reasons (explored in my July 7,
2003, column), Republican-appointed
justices without ideological anchors tend to
become more liberal over time.
Justice O'Connor is still conservative on
some issues, as recently demonstrated by her
passionate dissents in two cases: the 5-4
decision allowing use of eminent domain to
take a person's property and give it to a
private company, and the 6-3 decision
narrowing states' rights. (Kennedy joined
the liberals in both cases.) O'Connor also
takes pains to avoid flat contradiction of her
prior opinions. But her current views do
contrast with positions that she once took on
all four of the biggest culture-war issues:
religion, abortion, racial preferences, and
gay rights.
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Religion. O'Connor joined conservatives
early on in some church-state decisions that
seem hard to reconcile with her more recent
opinions and votes. In 1983, she joined a 6-
3 ruling that the Constitution permits a state
legislature to pay a chaplain to open each
day's session with a prayer; in 1984, she
joined a 5-4 ruling that a city may include a
Nativity scene as part of an official
Christmas display. And she has consistently
supported some government aid programs
that benefit religious schools.
By 1985, however, O'Connor had begun to
side with liberals in attacking governmental
actions that appear to endorse religion. She
joined in a 6-3 decision that year striking
down an Alabama law that allowed a daily
minute of silent meditation or prayer in the
public schools. [Her concurrence condemned
any governmental "message that religion or
a particular religious belief is favored or
preferred." Since then, that view has led her
to join decisions banning state-sponsored
nondenominational prayers at public school
graduation ceremonies (in 1992) and
football games (in 2000).
So it was no great surprise on June 27 to see
O'Connor joining liberals (including Breyer)
in a 5-4 decision ordering removal of framed
copies of the Ten Commandments that
officials had recently, with a clear religious
purpose, put on the walls of two Kentucky
courthouses. It was a bit more surprising to
see her part with Breyer by voting to order
removal of a six-foot-high monument
containing the Decalogue from the grounds
of the Texas Capitol. That would have
doomed dozens of similar monuments
around the country. But in the Texas case
she was in dissent, with Breyer (and
Kennedy) joining the three conservatives.
Breyer's concurrence said the Texas case
was different because the monument had
stood for 40 years with few objections and
conveyed a mainly "moral and historical"
message.
Abortion. In her first two abortion cases,
in 1983 and 1986, O'Connor voted (in
dissent) to uphold some relatively mild
restrictions. More important, she also
asserted in her 1983 dissent that states have
"compelling interests in the protection of
potential human life . . . throughout
pregnancy," and that Roe v. Wade's three-
trimester framework for regulating abortion
was "on a collision course with itself." Such
statements fostered speculation that she
would eventually vote to overrule Roe.
But later in the 1980s, O'Connor began
siding with the liberals on some issues. And
in 1992, she joined a 5-4 decision
reaffirming what the pivotal opinion-co-
authored by O'Connor, Kennedy, and
Souter-called "the essential holding of Roe
v. Wade." While they upheld a 24-hour
waiting period and some other previously
forbidden restrictions, this was a seismic
defeat for the right-to-life movement.
Then, in 2000, O'Connor tipped the balance
in a 5-4 decision striking down state laws
against the grisly procedure that opponents
call "partial-birth abortion." This prompted
a cry of betrayal (in dissent) from Kennedy,
who had no thought of blessing such an
"abhorrent" procedure when he reaffirmed
Roe. (The pro-Roe count had become 6-3
when Ginsburg replaced Justice Byron
White in 1993.)
Racial preferences. Never a colorblind-
Constitution absolutist, O'Connor hinted as
early as 1986 that "promoting racial
diversity" on a school's faculty might justify
racial preferences. She also voted in 1987 to
uphold some job preferences for women.
But O'Connor joined conservatives in
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finding serious fault with all seven of the
specific racial-preference programs to come
before her before 2003. In 1989, in striking
down a city's program setting aside a
percentage of its contract dollars for
minority contractors, she wrote that such
preferences "promote notions of racial
inferiority and lead to a politics of racial
hostility." She also seemed to suggest that
governmental racial-preference programs
were unconstitutional except when
necessary to remedy proven racial
discrimination.
In 2003, however, O'Connor gave racial-
preference proponents their greatest victory,
by writing a 5-4 decision approving
extremely large racial preferences in
admissions at the University of Michigan
Law School and around the country, in the
name of seeking a more diverse student
body.
To be sure, O'Connor joined conservatives
the same day in striking down (also by 5-4)
the all-too-transparent, overtly numerical
preferences used by Michigan's
undergraduate school. But the law school
decision was far more important. Taken
together, while requiring admissions officers
to make a pretense of giving each applicant
individualized consideration, the decisions
upheld what Rehnquist's dissent
demonstrated to be a de facto racial quota.
Gay rights. In 1986, O'Connor joined an
opinion for a 5-4 conservative majority
upholding use of a Georgia sodomy law to
prosecute two men for having sex in their
bedroom and rejecting as "facetious" a claim
that due process protected such acts.
But in 1996, O'Connor seemed to reverse
course, by joining a 6-3 decision invoking
the equal protection clause to strike down a
Colorado ballot referendum. It had barred
localities (and the state) from including
protections for gays in their
antidiscrimination laws. And in 2003, she
joined a 6-3 decision striking down a Texas
law against homosexual sodomy.
The other five justices also reinterpreted the
due process clause and overruled the 1986
sodomy decision. O'Connor parted
company with them there. She argued for a
narrow ruling that Texas (unlike Georgia)
had violated equal protection (not due
process) by barring only homosexual (not
heterosexual) sodomy. But few scholars (if
any) take these hairsplitting distinctions
seriously.
The bottom line is that Justice O'Connor
leans to the liberal side on the most divisive
issues that come before the Court. Of
course, no matter what she does, many
liberals will never forgive her for joining the
5-4 decision that handed the 2000 election to
George W. Bush. And they will be more
than a little upset if she retires before Bush
is gone.
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"A Majority of One"
New York Times
June 3, 2001
Jeffrey Rosen
We are all living now in Sandra Day
O'Connor's America. Take almost any of
the most divisive questions of American life,
and Justice O'Connor either has decided it or
is about to decide it on our behalf. The
Supreme Court may tell us soon whether
affirmative action in public universities is
permissible, and if it does, O'Connor is
likely to cast the deciding vote. The court is
divided about school vouchers too;
O'Connor's views will probably tip the
scales.
Voting districts drawn for the benefit of
minorities have to be submitted for
O'Connor's approval and stand or fall on
whether she finds their shapes bizarre. Roe
v. Wade has been tailored according to
O'Connor's specifications, and judges and
legislators have to scrutinize all abortion
restrictions in an effort to predict whether
O'Connor might consider them an "undue
burden" on the right to choose. And in
December O'Connor helped to decide the
presidential election, joining the 5-4 vote to
stop the Florida recount and delivering the
White House to George W. Bush.
Now, 20 years after she took her seat as the
first woman on the court, O'Connor may see
her power grow greater still. After one
television network prematurely called
Florida for Al Gore on election night, John
O'Connor, the justice's husband, was
reported to have expressed distress,
lamenting that O'Connor wanted to retire
and that Gore's victory would make this
impossible. The Bush victory, presumably,
cleared the way for a smooth exit:
O'Connor, who is 71, could step down
knowing her replacement would be a
Republican nominee. Last month, however,
O'Connor announced that she had "no
present plans to retire." Speculation has
since focused on whether Chief Justice
William Rehnquist might resign. And if he
does, there are already Republicans and
even a few Democrats who have in mind a
natural successor: Rehnquist's Stanford Law
School classmate and fellow Arizonan,
Sandra Day O'Connor.
Whether she becomes the first woman to
serve as chief justice, O'Connor is already
the most powerful woman in America. How
did she achieve this formidable distinction?
Part of the explanation is the coincidence of
her position at the center of a divided court.
The Rehnquist court frequently decides its
most important cases by a single vote, with
the three conservatives (Rehnquist, Antonin
Scalia and Clarence Thomas), joined by the
two moderate conservatives (Anthony
Kennedy and O'Connor), in the majority and
the four liberals (John Paul Stevens, David
Souter, Ruth Bader Ginsburg and Stephen
Breyer) in dissent. Kennedy and O'Connor
have long been competing for the role of
decisive swing vote: from 1994 to 2000,
each was on the winning side of the same
number of 5-4 cases. Last term, O'Connor
wrote only one dissenting opinion,
approaching Justice William Brennan's
record of zero dissents in 1967 at the height
of the Warren era.
But there have been many swing votes in the
history of the court. O'Connor is arguably
the most powerful of all of them because of
the distinctive way she approaches her job.
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In case after case, she will join the majority
and then write a concurring opinion that
seems designed to drain her colleagues'
reasoning of its more general implications.
She has a habit of confining her vote to the
case at hand. Her views are so exquisitely
calibrated that once in a voting rights case
she wrote a separate concurrence to her own
opinion, prompting Pam Karlan, a voting
rights scholar at Stanford Law School, to
say, "At last, O'Connor has found someone
she can agree with: herself."
O'Connor's narrow opinions have the effect
of preserving her ability to change her mind
in future cases. It is not that O'Connor is
easily swayed by the lobbying of her fellow
justices: there is little lobbying or horse-
trading on the Rehnquist court. (Indeed, the
justices rarely have substantive discussions.)
It is that she approaches her job less like a
typical justice than like the state legislator
she once was. O'Connor, who prefers vague
standards to clear rules, does not derive her
opinions from consistent principles that
guide her from case to case. Her pragmatic
approach allows her to remain not only at
the center of the court but also at the center
of American politics.
Antonin Scalia, O'Connor's frequent
sparring partner, has noted that deciding
cases according to principle is the way that
judges restrain themselves. "When, in
writing for the majority of the court, I adopt
a general rule and say, 'This is the basis of
our decision,' I not only constrain lower
courts, I constrain myself as well," Scalia
declared in his Holmes Lecture at Harvard
in 1989. "If the next case should have such
different facts that my political or policy
preferences regarding the outcome are quite
the opposite, I will be unable to indulge
those preferences; I have committed myself
to the governing principle." Scalia
sometimes betrays his own principles-
ignoring the original understanding of the
Constitution in voting rights cases, for
example-but he reminds us how important
it is for judges to have principles to betray.
By her refusal to commit herself to
consistent principles, O'Connor forces the
court and those who follow it to engage in a
guessing game about her wishes in case after
case. Each of her decisions is a ticket for
one train only. This is not to say, however,
that there are no consistencies that mark her
tenure. Over the years she has emerged as
the leader of the federalism revolution that
may be the Rehnquist court's most
distinctive legacy, returning power from
Washington to the states. And although she
is not a committed social conservative, she
is a committed anti-government
conservative-a justice eager to second-
guess the judgments of state and federal
lawmakers and executives. By refusing to
defer to Congress and the president, she has
enhanced not only her own power but also
the power of the court itself. If she is, in
fact, nominated as the next chief justice, her
generally moderate votes should give less
pause than her view that no branch of
government is entitled to respect except the
one to which she belongs.
O'Connor was the first woman to be elected
majority leader of any state senate in the
nation, and her experience as an Arizona
legislator continues to influence the way she
approaches her job. Most Saturdays when
the court is in session, she and her clerks
meet in chambers to discuss the cases that
she will consider during oral arguments in
the week to follow. "She makes lunch for
everybody-Tex-Mex, Southwestern fare,"
says Marci Hamilton, a former clerk who is
now a professor at Cardozo Law School in
New York. "She cooks it up and brings it
from home. Then we would sit down and
talk about the cases and eat."
54
There are justices-Scalia and Thomas, for
example-who conduct their discussions
with clerks as freewheeling debates about
the law. O'Connor's discussions are more
formal, like a senator's receiving briefings
from her staff. She is unusual among
justices in requiring her clerks to write
extensive memorandums about a case before
any discussion. During the Saturday
meetings, a clerk who has prepared a
memorandum will give a brief presentation;
then O'Connor will ask the other clerks to
make short presentations of their own.
After hearing her clerks' views and
reviewing the briefs, O'Connor sometimes
announces her vote or suggests that she has
not yet made up her mind. At oral
arguments, she is an active questioner and
often makes little effort to conceal her
views, confessing her ambivalence or
revealing her skepticism about one side or
the other. She is genuinely open-minded in
many cases, especially those involving race
and religion, and-like a legislator-is
especially moved by arguments about the
practical effects of a decision.
Once she makes up her mind, however,
O'Connor continues to try to keep her
options open. Like a politician, she is
careful not to tie herself down in the future,
instructing her clerks to write majority
opinions as narrowly as possible. "She tries
very hard to avoid broad rules, for fear that
if you speak too broadly, you might bind
yourself down the road," says one former
clerk, who, like most of O'Connor's former
clerks I spoke with, asked not to be
identified. (The justice was said to be
infuriated a few years ago by Edward
Lazarus's Closed Chambers, a tell-all book
about the court.) Another former clerk says:
"She's very careful to write minimalist
opinions, taking each case one at a time and
trying not to decide too much that's not
before the court. She really has no grand
constitutional theory. But that's a different
sense of calculatedness than the idea that she
holds out in order to dictate what the court
says, which I didn't see at all."
In a C-Span profile broadcast last
December, O'Connor described her typical
day. "I'm a fan of reading a newspaper in
the morning," she said. "By 5:30 or so I'm
awake and ready to get up and get going,
and I'm usually outside . . . looking for the
newspaper before it's even arrived. And
once it does, we have a little breakfast and
read the paper and I go down to the court...
. I try to leave the house around 7:15 to go
downtown and beat some of the traffic. And
the first thing I do at the court is have an
hour of exercise." Since her first days on
the bench, O'Connor has organized a
morning aerobics and yoga class for female
clerks and employees on the Supreme Court
basketball court, known as the highest court
in the land.
More than some of her colleagues, O'Connor
enjoys the ceremonial aspects of her job and
has handled the public scrutiny that
accompanies being the first female justice
with poise and confidence. According to
Ruth McGregor, who clerked for O'Connor
in 1981 and now sits on the Arizona
Supreme Court, O'Connor received more
than 500 letters a week during her first term,
and she tried to answer all of them. "The
thing I noticed was how personal the
communications were, partly because her
hearings had been televised and perhaps
people related more easily to a woman,"
McGregor says. "People sent hand-knit
socks and homemade fudge and pictures of
their grandchildren."
The mail has tapered off a little over the
years, but O'Connor continues to travel the
world like a head of state, giving worthy
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speeches at law-school dedications and
international events about the importance of
federalism and hard work. She is a fixture
on the Georgetown party circuit, where her
husband, John, a Washington lawyer, is
popular for telling humorous stories in
Scottish and Irish dialect. She is also
attentive to her press clippings. "Charles
Barkley came to the court one day with
Justice Thomas, and Thomas, being the way
he is, he doesn't tell anybody about it,"
recalls a former clerk for another of the
justices. When O'Connor learned that
Barkley was in the building, she had him
photographed for the Washington Post Style
section putting an ornament on the
Christmas tree in her chambers.
In addition to cultivating her public persona,
O'Connor takes a warm interest in her clerks'
welfare and goes out of her way to organize
events and outings for their amusement and
instruction. Clerks recall excursions to see
the cherry blossoms, a tour of Washington
by a Civil War historian and outings with
the justice for white-water rafting, fly
fishing and hiking in the Blue Ridge
Mountains. "She loves to hike, she loves
skiing, she loves tennis, she loves golf," says
her brother, H. Alan Day. A few days after
deciding Bush v. Gore, she scored her first
hole in one.
Early in her tenure, several commentators
suggested that O'Connor's opinions were
written in a distinctively feminine voice. In
1986, Suzanna Sherry, then a law professor
at the University of Minnesota, cited the
works of Carol Gilligan on behalf of the
proposition that "while women emphasize
connection, subjectivity and responsibility,
men emphasize autonomy, objectivity and
rights." Painting O'Connor as the apotheosis
of "difference" feminism, Sherry ventured
that the justice's preference for moderation
over confrontation-and community over
individualism-was attributable to her sex.
O'Connor herself has little patience for these
stereotypes, and in a speech at N.Y.U in
1991, she strenuously rejected Sherry's
thesis. "This 'New Feminism' is interesting
but troubling, precisely because it so nearly
echoes the Victorian myth of the 'True
Woman' that kept women out of law for so
long," O'Connor declared. "Asking whether
women attorneys speak with a 'different
voice' than men do is a question that is both
dangerous and unanswerable."
According to Marci Hamilton, the former
O'Connor clerk: "When you grow up riding
wild horses-Western women tend not to
buy that different voices stuff. They tend to
be pretty much in the camp of 'Annie Get
Your Gun': Anything he can do, I can do
better."
Being a woman has shaped O'Connor's work
far less, it would seem, than being a
legislator. O'Connor's service as majority
leader of the Arizona State Senate was one
of the formative experiences of her life, and
it is remarkable how much her approach as
majority leader anticipates the role that she
would come to play on the Supreme Court.
In the 1970's, the Arizona Senate was almost
evenly divided: 16 Republicans and 14
Democrats. Most of the issues that
O'Connor faced were practical challenges-
like the effort to divert water from the
Colorado River to Arizona as part of the
Central Arizona Project-and her tendency
was to confront them in a bipartisan spirit.
"I can't remember a damn thing we ever
came to blows over really," recalls Bob
Stump, who was the Democratic minority
leader during O'Connor's years as majority
leader and is now a Republican congressman
from Arizona, having switched parties in
1982. At the end of each session, Stump
says, O'Connor would invite Democrats and
Republicans over to her house for a
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bipartisan party, where she would cook
burritos and tortillas.
According to Stump, O'Connor's chief
opposition came not primarily from
Democrats but from the John Birch wing of
her own party, which was clamoring to
abolish the income tax and investigate the
United Nations. "It was more moderating
them than it was bringing our side around,"
he says. As majority leader, O'Connor
viewed it as her mandate to rein in the
conservative extremists. And she was
independent-minded enough to break ranks
with her party on issues she cared deeply
about. Stump says that the Senate, with
overwhelming Democratic and Republican
support, passed a law giving direct financial
aid to parochial schools. Insisting that the
bill was unconstitutional, O'Connor was the
only Republican to join three Democrats in
opposing it. "In those days, that was a very
unpopular thing to do," Stump says. Later
the Arizona Supreme Court agreed with
O'Connor's position and struck down the
law.
O'Connor has shown similar independence
on the Supreme Court, suggesting that the
Constitution permits some aid to religious
schools and some race consciousness, but
not too much-which is more or less the
view of the majority of American voters. A
few weeks ago, for example, after voting
repeatedly to strike down voting districts
drawn for the benefit of minorities,
O'Connor broke rank with her conservative
colleagues and decided that she could live
with a redrawn North Carolina voting
district that she had first expressed concern
about in 1993.
I called David Garrow, the Pulitzer Prize-
winning author and a Supreme Court
historian at Emory Law School, to ask what
he made of her apparent change of heart. "Is
there an extensive, deep-seated
indecisiveness to her?" Garrow asked. "And
is there something wrong about using
'indecisive' to characterize a female justice?"
Garrow posed some more blunt questions.
"Does she at some deep level doubt her own
ability? Is that the way to understand this
two-steps-forward, two-steps-back quality to
her decision making, that she's not at all
certain about her own judgment? If she
doesn't lack the courage of her convictions,
she lacks the clarity of her convictions."
These are strong sentiments-and I have
expressed similar sentiments in the past.
But those who have worked with O'Connor
insist that she is anything but indecisive, as
does O'Connor herself. "When I'm at the
court faced with a case, I try to find out
everything about that case I can," O'Connor
told the National Coalition of Cancer
Survivorship in 1996. "Then I make my
decision, and I don't look back. I do not
look back and say, 'Oh, what if I had done
the other thing,' or 'Oh, I should have done
something else."'
Deborah Jones Merritt, another of
O'Connor's former clerks-she is now the
director of the John Glenn Institute at Ohio
State-says: "Indecisive is probably the last
word I would ever choose to describe Justice
O'Connor. She would listen to all the
arguments, get the answers and then be very
decisive about her view in the case."
In her decisiveness about the bottom line,
O'Connor operates in marked contrast to her
fellow swing justice, Anthony Kennedy.
"I'm more of an agonizer than many of our
colleagues," Kennedy told me five years
ago. In his meetings with clerks, Kennedy
experiments with different opinions. He
sketches out various arguments on a white
board in his chambers, often announcing
that he is persuaded by one position only to
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return the next morning to declare that he
has been thinking about the case overnight
and now is inclined to take the opposite
view. Once Kennedy makes up his mind,
however, he is far more willing than
O'Connor to embrace broad principles that
constrain his discretion in future cases.
During a recent visit to O'Connor's office, I
found a bit more evidence of her
decisiveness. She declined to grant an
interview for this article but kindly agreed to
show me around her chambers. At the front
of the Supreme Court Building, her airy
inner office, painted in Southwestern earth
tones, has a spectacular view of the Capitol
and the court steps, where there were
protesters demonstrating against Roe v.
Wade and Bush v. Gore. Her inner office is
decorated with Zuni drums, a Carl Oscar
Borg landscape of the Grand Canyon and
George Catlin paintings of a buffalo hunt in
the Rocky Mountains. With her steady gaze
and beige suit, O'Connor seemed like a
formidable C.E.O. of the most powerful
corporation in America, but she was also
gracious and candid, although
understandably wary. (I've written critically
about several of her decisions.) She came to
life when I produced a copy of Where the
Bluebird Sings to the Lemonade Springs, a
collection of essays by her favorite author,
Wallace Stegner. And she talked with
warmth and enthusiasm about Stegner, the
great chronicler of the West who was also
her creative-writing teacher at Stanford.
Soon, it was time for our tour. By her large
desk, there was a cartoon of O'Connor on a
swing being pushed by Jerry Falwell.
Above it was a framed front page from
Newsday celebrating her confirmation in
1981 with the headline "Her Honor." There
were photographs of O'Connor's three sons
and her grandchildren. As I tried to take it
all in, she bustled me along to the outer
office, past a signed basketball from the U.S.
Women's Olympic team. Suddenly, the tour
was over. Realizing that I had left the
Stegner book on the couch in her inner
chambers, I went back to retrieve it. On the
chair where the justice had been sitting, I
noticed a hand-stitched pillow, embroidered
with the motto: "Maybe in error but never
in doubt."
By her own account, the roots of O'Connor's
self-confidence came from her upbringing
riding horses and roping steers on the Lazy
B cattle ranch, a 250-square-mile tract on
the Arizona-New Mexico border that is 35
miles from the nearest town and 12 miles
from the nearest neighbor. During the C-
Span biography, O'Connor quoted Wallace
Stegner's description of growing up in the
West: "There is something about living in
big empty space, where people are few and
distant, under a great sky that is alternately
serene and furious, exposed to sun from 4 in
the morning until 9 at night, and to a wind
that never seems to rest-there is something
about exposure to that big country that not
only tells an individual how small he is, but
steadily tells him who he is." O'Connor
continued with a vivid recollection of
driving around the ranch in a pickup truck
with her father, waiting for the rain that the
grass and the cattle needed to survive. "Rain
was our life's blood . . . the essential
element, the most treasured event, prayed
for, hoped for, anticipated, savored when it
came . . . celebrated and enjoyed-every
drop," she recalled. "Joy, wonder,
incredible gift from above."
O'Connor and her 61-year-old brother, Alan
Day, have been writing a memoir about
growing up on the ranch, which is scheduled
for publication early next year. "A lot of
people have asked Sandra through the years
how someone from a rural, humble,
agricultural background could have achieved
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what she's achieved, and maybe this book is
a long answer to that question," Day says.
Day, who ran the family ranch for many
years, says that his sister's upbringing as a
rancher made her independent and self-
reliant. "You would be out on the ranch in a
pickup or on horseback, or whatever," he
relates, "when you would come upon a
situation that needed a response: a broken
fence or a windmill or a sick cow or a flat
tire or a broken fan belt. There wasn't
anybody to call and there wasn't anybody to
take care of you. You very quickly learned
that you're responsible for yourself." In
deliberate Western cadences very similar to
his sister's, Day expresses moving, brotherly
admiration for her impressive example:
"The essence of Sandra is that if you're
around her very much, the bar is raised in
your life. You just feel like doing better
things and being a better person."
After attending school in El Paso, where she
lived during the school year with her
grandmother, O'Connor enrolled at Stanford
at 16 and then after graduating attended
Stanford Law School. At law school, she
dated her classmate William Rehnquist and
met her future husband and fellow law-
review editor, John O'Connor.
The story of her progress after law school
has been told often. Because of her sex, she
was unable to get a job in a law firm;
instead, she became a deputy county
attorney in San Mateo, Calif., in 1952. After
spending several years in Germany, where
John served in the Army, the couple moved
to Arizona, where O'Connor set up a private
practice in a shopping mall. After taking
some time off to have three sons, she
returned to full-time work when her
youngest boy began school. She spent four
years as an assistant attorney general in
Arizona, where she developed a reputation
for attention to detail. In 1964, she served
as a precinct captain for Barry Goldwater,
who remained a close friend until his death.
(A picture of both of them hangs in her
chambers, inscribed, "Hi Sandy-Love,
Barry.") Appointed in 1969 to fill a vacancy
as an Arizona state senator, she was elected
on her own the following year, and in 1973
she became majority leader.
In the Arizona Senate, O'Connor was less
socially conservative than some of her
Republican colleagues, not only opposing
aid to religious schools but also staking out a
moderate position on abortion. In 1970,
three years before Roe was decided,
O'Connor voted to repeal Arizona's
draconian anti-abortion law, and the year
after Roe came down, she voted against a
petition asking Congress to pass a human
life amendment to the Constitution. In her
interview with President Reagan before he
nominated her to the court-she was by then
a judge on the Arizona Court of Appeals-
O'Connor emphasized her personal
opposition to abortion but did not commit
herself one way or the other on the subject
of Roe. During her confirmation hearings,
her fiercest opposition came from anti-
abortion conservatives who felt that her
moderate record on abortion in the Arizona
Legislature meant that she could not be
counted on to overturn Roe. As it turned
out, O'Connor's conservative critics were
right to worry. O'Connor staked out her
ambivalent position in the very first abortion
case she heard, in 1983, in which she
denounced Roe without explicitly calling for
it to be overturned. Instead, she proposed
her own test for evaluating restrictions on a
woman seeking an abortion-whether the
restriction "unduly burdened" the right to
choose. By adopting the vague "undue
burden" language, O'Connor gave herself
lots of discretion to decide, from case to
case, whether or not she considered a
particular abortion restriction permissible.
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Between 1983 and 1992, O'Connor upheld
every abortion restriction she confronted.
According to Lazarus's Closed Chambers,
liberal clerks were so concerned that
O'Connor would overturn Roe that a few
female clerks toyed with the idea of having
one of them fake an unwanted pregnancy
and break down while discussing it in the
locker room after O'Connor's morning
aerobics class, so that the justice was certain
to overhear. But these theatrics were
unnecessary: in 1989, despite strong
pressure from conservatives, O'Connor
refused to provide the fifth vote to overturn
Roe itself. And three years later in Planned
Parenthood v. Casey, a case involving a
Pennsylvania anti-abortion law, she joined
Souter and Kennedy in upholding what they
called the core holding of Roe: namely, that
states may not place serious restrictions on
abortion before fetal viability.
O'Connor's performance in Casey was
characteristically self-assured and judicially
aggressive. According to a former clerk
involved with the decision, she was most
offended by the provisions of the
Pennsylvania law requiring wives to notify
their husbands before having an abortion.
Having decided to strike that down, she was
amenable to Souter's suggestion that they
write an opinion that would preserve the
core of Roe. She and Souter then
approached Kennedy, who agreed to adopt
O'Connor's "undue burden" standard as the
new test for evaluating all abortion
restrictions. While Kennedy agonized
endlessly about the decision-wavering
until the final days before the opinion
circulated and musing openly about writing
a brief opinion that would sidestep the
question of whether abortion is a
fundamental right-O'Connor made her
decision and never looked back. Using the
same reasoning that she would turn to in
Bush v. Gore, the majority opinion justified
the decision to short-circuit the political
debate about abortion on the grounds that
the court had to save the country from
legislative battles that could only polarize
and divide Americans.
Last summer, when it came time to evaluate
the constitutionality of so-called partial-birth
abortion laws, O'Connor provided a fifth
vote for Stephen Breyer's expansive 5-4
decision striking down 31 state laws that
restrict late-term abortions. Kennedy, by
contrast, wrote an angry dissent, suggesting
that he had been duped in 1992 into
supporting a malleable legal standard that
O'Connor and the liberal justices were
invoking to strike down abortion restrictions
far later in pregnancy than he had
anticipated-restrictions supported by
George W. Bush, Al Gore and two-thirds of
the American people.
O'Connor's conservatism is found less in her
views about social issues than in her views
about where political power rests. She is
adamantly anti-Washington. She is not
alone, of course. In its view toward federal
power, the Rehnquist court is the least
deferential court in American history. Seth
Waxman, who served as solicitor general in
the Clinton administration, notes that in the
first 200 years after the Constitution was
ratified, the Supreme Court struck down
only 127 federal laws. In the past six years
alone, the Rehnquist court has struck down
28 federal laws. O'Connor joined all but six
of these decisions. (The most restrained
justices are Breyer and Ginsburg, who
dissented in half the cases.)
Her attachment to states' rights seems to
have stemmed from her upbringing on the
Lazy B ranch, where her father was an
opponent of Franklin D. Roosevelt and the
New Deal. Today, less than 15 percent of
the land is privately owned in Arizona, and
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federal land and water regulations are a
constant source of frustration to ranchers
like her brother. "I got really discouraged
with the way the federal government leases
their land for grazing," Alan Day says.
"Sandra is very much a federalist, which is
saying the states should be able to solve
more of their problems and the federal
government should stick their nose in as
little as possible. I think that certainly
comes from her heritage in the West."
But during the past few years, it has become
increasingly clear that the federalism
revolution that O'Connor has led is not only
about states' rights. It is also about the
growing determination of O'Connor and her
conservative colleagues to reserve for
themselves the exclusive authority to decide
what counts as illegal and impermissible in
America. Last year, for example, O'Connor
and the four conservative justices held that
private individuals could not sue the states
for violating the federal age discrimination
act. O'Connor did not think that age
discrimination was a national problem, even
though Congress thought otherwise when it
passed the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act.
Later that same year, O'Connor joined the
four conservatives in striking down part of
the Violence Against Women Act. They
dismissed the voluminous evidence that had
led Congress to conclude that the states were
failing to respond adequately to gender-
motivated violence. In this and other cases,
O'Connor's experience as a state legislator
seems to have given her a robust skepticism
about the state and federal legislative
process. "Somebody was making the case
about a state legislature, and the gist of her
comment was, 'I was in a state legislature-I
know how foolishly they can act,'" a former
clerk remembers. "Having been there, she
understood that these were not such wise
deliberative bodies."
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"Fall Cases on Hot-Button Issues
May Hinge on the New Justice"
Washington Post
July 5, 2005
Charles Lane
Abortion. Physician-assisted suicide. Gay
rights. How will the Supreme Court handle
those issues without Justice Sandra Day
O'Connor, the centrist swing voter who
announced her retirement from the court last
week after a 24-year tenure?
Actually, it probably won't take long to find
out. The abortion rights of teenagers,
administration efforts to override a state
right-to-die law, and the military's "don't
ask, don't tell" policy are all on the docket
for the court term that begins Oct. 3.
O'Connor's past opinions show that she
would have played a pivotal role in these
cases. Now, their outcome may hinge on the
views of her successor. Learning those
views may prove challenging to senators, if
a nominee adheres to the practice of not
answering questions about matters that are,
or soon will be, before the court.
"One of the fascinating dances in the
confirmation process is going to be how
much you can get a nominee to answer, even
about relatively recent precedents, when the
issues are presented in cases that are
pending on the docket," said Douglas W.
Kmiec, a professor of constitutional law at
Pepperdine University.
The retirement of O'Connor, who often cast
the deciding vote in the court's cases, could
portend great change at the court, especially
if President Bush replaces her with a
steadfastly conservative nominee, as many
expect.
If O'Connor's career teaches anything, it is
.that a justice's initial votes on the court are
not necessarily a reliable guide to what that
justice will do in the course of a long, life-
tenured career. In her first years, she leaned
heavily against abortion and affirmative
action, only to tack in the other direction
later.
Even if O'Connor were replaced by a
conservative opponent of Roe v. Wade, the
1973 ruling recognizing a right to abortion,
Roe would still have the support of a five-
justice majority. Any challenge to its core
holding would take years to bubble up from
lower courts.
Still, next term will present O'Connor's
successor with a chance to answer important
questions about the scope of Roe as well as
other precedents.
For example, a 1992 Supreme Court
decision, co-written by O'Connor, set forth a
test for the constitutionality of state abortion
regulations, saying they must not impose an
"undue burden" on exercising the right to
abortion.
The court defined an undue burden as a law
that "in a large fraction of cases" puts a
"substantial obstacle" in the way of someone
seeking an abortion.
At the same time, the court has said that
states may pass laws requiring minors to
notify their parents of plans to terminate a
pregnancy, as long as they permit minors to
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seek a court's permission when informing
their parents is impossible or dangerous.
The court has never clarified whether
O'Connor's "undue burden" test means that
parental-notification laws, which are on the
books in 33 states, must include an explicit
exception for cases in which the pregnant
girl's health is at risk.
But in Ayotte v. Planned Parenthood, No.
04-1144, which is to be argued in December
and decided by mid-2006, the court will rule
on a New Hampshire law that has no health
exception. The U.S. Court of Appeals for
the 1st Circuit, based in Boston, ruled last
year that the New Hampshire law is
unconstitutional and cannot go into effect.
In its appeal, however, New Hampshire said
the 1st Circuit applied the wrong legal
standard. It cited a 1987 Supreme Court
ruling that suggests opponents of the law
must show that the law would limit abortion
rights not just in some or most cases but in
all cases.
If the justices affirm the ruling of the I st
Circuit, striking down the law, the effect
will be to fortify and entrench Supreme
Court precedents on abortion rights. If the
court rules in favor of New Hampshire law,
it will open the door to other states to adopt
similar legislation.
Any elucidation of the court's view of its
doctrine of a health exception could also
affect the federal ban on the procedure
critics call "partial birth" abortion. Enacted
by Congress with Bush's support in 2003, it
included no exception to protect the
woman's health. But three district courts
have found it unconstitutional under a 5 to 4
Supreme Court ruling in 2000, joined by
O'Connor, that said such bans must include
a health exception.
The government's appeals are pending, and
conflicting decisions by appeals courts could
lead to a Supreme Court case in the early
years of O'Connor's successor.
In October, physician-assisted suicide will
be before the court in Gonzales v. Oregon,
No. 04-623. The administration has
appealed a lower court's order barring the
Justice Department from taking away the
prescribing rights of Oregon doctors who
prescribe lethal doses of drugs to terminally
ill patients who have chosen to die under
that state's 11-year-old Death With Dignity
Act.
Assisted suicide is an intensely emotional
issue, both for advocates of a "right to die,"
who see it as many people's only means of a
dignified death, and for conservative
Christians, who see it as a form of murder.
Opposition to laws such as Oregon's was a
favorite cause of former attorney general
John D. Ashcroft, who issued a November
2001 directive determining that assisting
suicide is not a "legitimate medical purpose"
under federal drug-control law-and that the
Drug Enforcement Administration could act
against any physician who authorized drugs
to help someone die.
The directive overturned a 1998 decision by
President Bill Clinton's attorney general,
Janet Reno, that permitted Oregon doctors to
assist in suicides.
Strictly speaking, the case does not involve
any assertion of a constitutionally protected
right to die. The court unanimously refused
to recognize such a right in 1997, ruling that
it should be left to the states to determine
whether legalized assisted suicide is wise
policy.
Rather, the case is framed by the parties as a
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clash between federal power to regulate
drugs and states' power to regulate the
practice of medicine.
But the practical effect of the Ashcroft
directive is to make Oregon's law a dead
letter-and O'Connor might have been
sympathetic to Oregon. She vigorously
dissented from the court's 6 to 3 ruling last
month in which it upheld a federal override
of California's medical marijuana law. In
the 1997 case, Washington v. Glucksberg,
the court was ruling on state bans on assisted
suicide. O'Connor was one of five justices
who wrote or signed concurring opinions
implying that they might not strike down a
state law such as the Oregon one that
permits assisted suicide.
"Death will be different for each of us," she
wrote. "For many the last days will be spent
in physical pain . . . some will seek
medication to alleviate that pain and other
symptoms."
In Rumsfeld v. FAIR, No. 04-1152, to be
argued in November, the question is whether
some law schools may curb military
recruiters' access to their students in protest
of the U.S. armed forces' ban on openly gay
members.
The court is being asked to rule on the
constitutionality of the Solomon
Amendment, a federal law that requires
universities to give military recruiters equal
access or risk millions of dollars in federal
funding.
Legal analysts generally expect a win for the
government, but the case will create a high-
profile forum in which both opponents and
supporters of the "don't ask, don't tell"
policy can fight out this particular battle of
the culture wars.
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"An Advocate for the Right"
New York Times
July 28, 2005
David E. Rosenbaum
The early 1980's were a heady time for
conservatives in Washington,
Ronald Reagan was president, and after
years on the outside, some of the strongest
voices in the conservative movement-men
like Edwin Meese III, James G. Watt,
William Bradford Reynolds and Theodore
B. Olson-were in high positions in the
government and were determined to reverse
what they believed to be years of liberal
policies in areas like civil rights,
environmental protection, criminal law and
immigration.
John G. Roberts, a young lawyer in the
Justice Department in 1981 and 1982 and on
the White House counsel's staff from 1982
to 1986, held positions too junior for him to
set policy in those days.
But his internal memorandums, some of
which have become public in recent days,
reveal a philosophy every bit as conservative
as that of the policy makers on the front
lines of the Reagan revolution and give
more definition to his image than was
apparent in the first days after President
Bush picked him to be an associate justice of
the Supreme Court.
On almost every issue he dealt with where
there were basically two sides, one more
conservative than the other, the documents
from the National Archives and the Ronald
Reagan Presidential Library show that Judge
Roberts, now of the United States Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit,
advocated the more conservative course.
Sometimes, he took positions even more
conservative than those of his prominent
superiors.
He favored less government enforcement of
civil rights laws rather than more. He
criticized court decisions that required a
thick wall between church and state. He
took the side of prosecutors over criminal
defendants. He maintained that the role of
the courts should be limited and the
president's powers enhanced.
Mr. Roberts was only 26 when he joined the
Reagan administration and 31 when he left.
But the ideology he expressed as a young
man helps explain why conservative
activists seem pleased with him, even
though others Mr. Bush might have picked
have a more detailed public record of
conservative advocacy.
Consider Mr. Roberts's stands on some of
the hottest political issues of the 1980's as
revealed in the newly public documents:
BUSING-In 1985, when he was an
assistant White House counsel, Mr. Roberts
took issue with Mr. Olson, an assistant
attorney general at the time, on whether
Congress could enact a law that outlawed
busing to achieve school desegregation.
Mr. Olson, who was one of the nation's most
widely known conservative lawyers on
constitutional matters, was arguing that
Congress's hands were tied because the
Supreme Court had ruled that busing was
constitutionally required in some
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circumstances.
Mr. Roberts wrote in a memorandum to the
White House counsel, Fred F. Fielding, that
Mr. Olson had misinterpreted the law. He
said evidence showed that by producing
white flight, busing promoted segregation.
"It strikes me as more than passing strange
for us to tell Congress it cannot pass a law
preventing courts from ordering busing
when our own Justice Department invariably
urges this policy on the courts," he wrote.
SEX DISCRIMINATION-Mr. Roberts
also challenged Mr. Reynolds, who was
assistant attorney general for civil rights and
another prominent conservative who
outranked him.
In 1981, he urged Attorney General William
French Smith to reject Mr. Reynolds's
position that the department should
intervene on behalf of female prisoners who
were discriminated against in a job-training
program. If male and female prisoners had
to be treated equally, Mr. Roberts argued,
"the end result in this time of state prison
budgets may be no programs for anyone."
JUDICIAL RESTRAINT-Mr. Roberts
consistently argued that courts should be
stripped of authority over busing, school
prayer and other matters. In a letter in
November 1981 to Judge Henry J. Friendly
of the United States Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit, in New York, for whom he
had clerked and whom he considered a
mentor, Mr. Roberts wrote that he and his
colleagues in the administration were
determined to "halt unwarranted
interference" by the courts in the activities of
Congress and the executive branch.
A month later, he wrote to Rex Lee, who
was the solicitor general, that courts were
"ill-suited to policy making because they are
limited to the facts presented to them."
Court-stripping is still an issue in American
politics. Last year, the House approved
legislation that would prevent federal courts
from ordering states to recognize same-sex
marriages in other states. The measure
never became law.
PRESIDENTIAL WAR POWERS-In
1983, Arthur J. Goldberg, the former
Supreme Court justice, wrote a letter to the
White House questioning President Reagan's
constitutional authority to send troops to
Grenada without a declaration of war.
Mr. Roberts replied with a ringing
endorsement of the president's power. "This
has been recognized at least since the time
President Jefferson sent the Marines to the
shores of Tripoli," he wrote. "While there is
no clear line separating what the president
may do on his own and what requires a
formal declaration of war, the Grenada
mission seems to be clearly acceptable as an
exercise of executive authority, particularly
when it is recalled that neither the Korean
nor Vietnamese conflicts were declared
wars."
AFFIRMATIVE ACTION-Mr. Roberts
held that affirmative action programs were
bound to fail because they required "the
recruiting of inadequately prepared
candidates."
"Under our view of the law," he wrote in
1981, "it is not enough to say that blacks and
women have been historically discriminated
against as groups and are therefore entitled
to special preferences."
IMMIGRATION-Mr. Roberts took strong
issue with a Supreme Court decision striking
down a Texas law that had allowed school
districts to deny enrollment to children who
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were in the country illegally. The court had
overreached its authority, he wrote, and the
Justice Department had made a mistake by
not entering the case on the state's side.
CHURCH-STATE-Mr. Roberts was
sharply critical of the Supreme Court
decision outlawing prayer in public schools,
and he said the court had exceeded its
authority when it allowed any citizens to
challenge the transfer of public property to a
parochial school.
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"Reading Robert's Mind"
August 1, 2005
The Weekly Standard
Terry Eastland
So, just who is John G. Roberts? His
brainpower, legal experience, and character
duly recognized, what is his judicial
philosophy? What is his approach to
judging-to interpreting and applying the
Constitution and other federal law? What
kind of jurist will he turn out to be-20, 30
years hence?
One place to look for the answer is in
Roberts's record as a federal circuit judge.
Appointed two years ago to the U.S. Court
of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit, Roberts has
participated in some 200 decisions and 100
orders. Of the 200 decisions, almost all
were unanimous, according to a review by
Anisha Dasgupta and Brian Fletcher (posted
at www.sctnomination.com/blog). Roberts
wrote the majority opinion in about 40
cases, drawing very few dissents. He also
wrote three concurrences and two dissents.
Most of his cases involved technical
questions of administrative law and proved
relatively noncontroversial. He has yet to sit
on a big social-issue case-one involving,
say, abortion, same-sex marriage, or
establishment of religion. Perhaps his case
of most national significance is Hamdan v.
Rumsfeld, in which he and two other judges
voted to affirm the validity of military
commissions under the 2001 congressional
resolution authorizing the president to "use
all necessary and appropriate force" against
al Qaeda, and to uphold the presidents
judgment that the Geneva Convention does
not apply to members of al Qaeda. Some of
Roberts's writing is notable.
In a case holding that the Drug Enforcement
Administration had wrongly blocked the
importation of ephedrine, which is used to
treat asthma, Roberts, in a concurrence, took
issue with the majority's reasoning. Arguing
for a narrower and "effectively conceded
basis" for disposing of the case, he invoked
"the cardinal principle of judicial restraint-
if it is not necessary to decide more, it is
necessary not to decide more." Regarding
the majority's rationale, he said, "I cannot go
along for that gratuitous ride."
Roberts dissented from a decision holding
that the secretary of labor went beyond her
statutory authority by issuing certain
reporting obligations for labor organizations.
Contending that the congressional
delegation of authority was broad enough to
encompass the secretary's action, Roberts
chided the majority for applying "the very
antithesis of deferential review."
Roberts wrote for a unanimous panel
upholding a lower court judgment that the
arrest, search, handcuffing, and detention of
a 12-year-old girl for eating a single French
fry in a Washington Metrorail station did not
transgress the Fourth and Fifth
Amendments. Roberts began his opinion,
"No one is very happy about the events that
led to this litigation," noting that the district
court described the policies leading to her
arrest as "foolish" and that indeed the
policies were changed after "those
responsible endured the sort of publicity
reserved for adults who make young girls
cry." But foolish policies were not
necessarily unconstitutional. "The question
before us," he wrote, "is not whether these
policies were a bad idea but whether they
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violated" the Constitution, and "we conclude
they did not."
Roberts dissented from his court's refusal to
rehear a panel decision on the scope of the
commerce clause. At issue was a judgment
upholding an order of the Fish and Wildlife
Service as a constitutional regulation of
interstate commerce. The agency told a
developer that it must remove a fence from
its own property in order to accommodate
the movement of arroyo toads. Roberts
faulted the panel's decision for failing to
ask-as he said it should have under recent
Supreme Court precedents-whether the
movement of a toad, a seemingly
noncommercial activity that occurs entirely
within the state of California-can be said to
be interstate commerce. "The panel's
approach in this case leads to the result that
regulating the taking of a hapless toad that,
for reasons of its own, lives its entire life in
California constitutes regulating 'Commerce
... among the several States."' Roberts also
noted that the panel's decision was in
conflict with another ruling in the circuit,
making it doubly necessary for the full court
to take up the case.
The sample size from the D.C. Circuit is
small, yet it points in certain directions.
Roberts seems to have a proper
understanding of the executive power that
Article II vests in the president. Whether he
agrees or not with the Supreme Court's
federalism precedents-and his opinion in
the arroyo toad case does seem sympathetic
to them-he is certainly willing to apply
them, as a lower-court judge must. At the
same time, Roberts defers to agency
judgments so long as there is sufficient
congressional authorization. His respect for
the separation of powers is such that he is
unwilling as a judge to condemn as
unconstitutional merely bad ideas embraced
by one of the other branches. Roberts's
conception of judicial restraint also
encompasses a preference for a narrower
ground of decision unless a broader one is
truly necessary. Roberts's own writing is
restrained, for it is marked by its lawyerly
precision and its avoidance of grandiose or
strident pronouncements. It is sometimes
dashed with humor, as witness the judge's
reflection on that hapless toad.
Another place to look for clues about
Roberts's judicial philosophy is in the work
he's done as an appellate lawyer. After
Harvard (he graduated in three years),
Harvard Law (he was editor of the Law
Review), clerkships first with federal circuit
judge Henry Friendly and then with
Associate Justice William Rehnquist, and
jobs advising Reagan's first attorney general
and then Reagan and his White House aides,
Roberts took a job at a prestigious
Washington law firm. There he began to
establish a reputation as one of the nation's
finest appellate lawyers. In 1989, Roberts
returned to the Justice Department, where he
worked as principal deputy solicitor general
under Kenneth Starr. In that capacity, of
course, he remained an appellate lawyer, his
client now the government, as he briefed and
argued cases in the Supreme Court. In 1993
he returned to private practice, leaving two
years ago when the Senate finally, and by
unanimous consent, approved his
nomination to the D.C. Circuit. (Roberts, it
bears noting, was in the first batch of judges
Bush nominated in 2001, his nomination not
moved until after the Republicans captured
the Senate in 2002. Earlier, in 1992, the first
President Bush had tapped Roberts for the
D.C. Circuit, but the Democratic Senate had
not been inclined to act on the nomination as
Election Day approached.)
Roberts has participated in cases involving a
wide range of subjects: administrative law,
admiralty, antitrust, arbitration, banking,
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bankruptcy, civil rights, constitutional law,
the environment, federal jurisdiction and
procedure, the First Amendment, health
care, Indians, interstate commerce, labor,
and patent and trade law. He has definitely
had his share of big, controversial cases,
especially when he worked in the first Bush
administration. As deputy solicitor general,
he helped prepare the government's briefs in
Rust v. Sullivan, Lee v. Weisman, and United
States v. Eichman, among other high-profile
cases. In Rust, the Court agreed with the
government's position that regulations
prohibiting family-planning services in
receipt of federal funds from advising on
abortion were not a violation of the free
speech clause. The brief also reminded the
Court that the government remained of the
view that the abortion right announced in
Roe v. Wade had no basis in the text,
structure, or history of the Constitution. In
Lee, the government argued, unsuccessfully,
that prayers at a public school graduation
ceremony were not an unconstitutional
establishment of religion. And in Eichman,
the government argued, also unsuccessfully,
that a federal law against burning the
American flag did not violate the free
speech clause.
During his confirmation hearing two years
ago, Roberts said that no one should infer
from the views of his clients what his own
views might be. That is a fair point, and
extends even to his time in the solicitor
general's office. For while it is surely true
that Roberts, a political appointee, was at
least in broad sympathy with the legal and
policy goals of the Bush administration, it
would be wrong to infer-to take the most
notable case-that the statement about Roe
in the Rust brief reflected his own view of
Roe. It might, or it might not. Roberts is
nowhere on the record on Roe, so far as
anyone can determine. His appellate
practice is not a very good place to look for
clues about his judicial philosophy.
Roberts told the committee that his practice
"has not been ideological in any sense. My
clients and their positions are liberal and
conservative across the board. I have argued
in favor of environmental restrictions and
against takings claims. I've argued in favor
of affirmative action. I've argued in favor of
prisoners' rights under the Eighth
Amendment. I've argued in favor of
antitrust enforcement. At the same time,
I've represented defendants charged with
antitrust cases. I've argued cases against
affirmative action." Roberts implored the
committee to look "at cases on both sides"
of an issue and "see if the professional skills
applied, the zealous advocacy is any
different." Roberts conceded that "that's not
judging . . . but it is the same skill, setting
aside personal views, taking the precedents
and applying them either as an advocate or
as a judge."
While the skill of setting aside personal
views and enforcing the law lies at the heart
of sound judging, there is much more to it
than that, especially for a Supreme Court
justice. Lower court judges work with the
precedents of their own circuits, and of
course they are bound by the decisions of
the Supreme Court. Justices, by contrast,
make the precedents governing the courts
below by interpreting statutes and the
Constitution. Moreover, they can overrule
their own decisions. Roberts's years as an
appellate lawyer seem useful mainly for
understanding his considerable
professionalism-and not for discerning
how he might interpret and apply the
Constitution.
Which brings us to another way to discover
Roberts's views on such matters: by asking
him directly about cases already decided.
Two years ago Judiciary Committee
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Democrats, with Charles Schumer taking the
lead, tried to get Roberts to discuss Supreme
Court cases. The effort failed. "I have
opinions about particular decisions," Roberts
told Schumer in one exchange. "Probably
every decision I read, I have an opinion
whether I think it is good, bad, or-." At
which point the eager and voluble Schumer
interrupted, apparently unaware that Roberts
had effectively stated that his mind is locked
in, rendering judgment, whenever he reads a
judicial decision. Now that Roberts has
been tapped for the High Court, Schumer
remains insistent that he declare his
"opinions about particular decisions." That's
not going to happen.
During the hearing, Roberts laid out his
reasons for what might be called nominee
restraint. A nominee who offered personal
views of the Court's precedents in the
confirmation process would undermine the
independence and integrity of the judiciary,
he said. Those important qualities are
ensured by the assumption that "judges
come to the cases before them
unencumbered by prior commitments
beyond the commitment to apply the rule of
law and the oath that they take."
When Schumer asked how it was any
different-was there not also harm done to
the judiciary?-when litigants go before the
Supreme Court knowing that some justices
have opined in previous cases in such a way
as to indicate opposition to their arguments,
Roberts said that it was different, precisely
because the confirmation process is not the
judicial process. "The concern is that you
are giving commitments, forecasts, hints,
even at the extreme, bargains, for
confirmation," whereas, in the judicial
process, "you are deciding a particular case
and stating your reasons for it." If a
nominee gave in effect "a prior
commitment" as to how a case should be
decided, that would be wrong, Roberts said,
and it would "have a distorted effect on how
that judge will appear to parties appearing
before him." Roberts was firm in drawing
this line, and Schumer concluded by
conceding how good a lawyer he is-far
better than I would ever be."
It is hard to imagine what might compel
Roberts to change course and discuss a
decision-unless, as was the case with Ruth
Bader Ginsburg in 1993, in a speech or
article he has said something about a ruling.
Ginsburg had criticized Roe's rationale in a
law review article, and thus felt compelled
to reiterate, when asked about the article
during her hearing, what she had said. But
she declined to offer an opinion about
Planned Parenthood v. Casey, which
sustained "the essential holding" of Roe. As
I write, three days after the announcement of
the nomination, the media having pursued
every detail about Roberts, it appears that he
has nowhere-either in print or a speech, on
the air, or in cyberspace, for that matter-
offered any "opinions about particular
decisions."
In his confirmation hearing, Roberts did
offer some views, not about decided cases,
but about judicial philosophy. Because he
was nominated to a lower court, he
emphasized his obligation to follow
Supreme Court precedents. But he also
seemed to endorse a way of approaching the
task of interpreting the Constitution. "I do
not think beginning with an all-
encompassing approach to constitutional
interpretation is the best way to faithfully
construe the document," he said. He said
that the Court itself didn't have such a
philosophy, but he also seemed to think that
the Court was right not to have one. He said
he didn't feel comfortable with labels like
originalist, textualist, or literalist, and he
said different constitutional provisions call
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for different interpretative approaches.
"You have a very different approach in
saying how you are going to give content to
the Fourth Amendment prohibition on
unreasonable searches and seizures. That's
one thing. It doesn't mean that you apply the
same approach to a far more specific
provision like the Seventh Amendment,"
which preserves the right of trial by jury in
suits at common law.
Doubtless, as the confirmation process
unfolds, Roberts will be asked to expand
upon his varied approaches to constitutional
interpretation. And about statutory
interpretation, specifically whether he would
consult legislative history in determining the
meaning of a statute. And about how he
would read the Court's precedents-
narrowly or broadly. And the circumstances
under which he might be willing to overrule
a case he thought wrongly decided. Nor
would such questions threaten judicial
independence and integrity. The answers
might tell us more about the man likely to be
our newest justice.
In choosing this nominee, Bush necessarily
chose to pass over the others on his short
list. There was more risk in choosing
Roberts than in picking some others on that
list, notably J. Michael Luttig, a federal
appellate judge of roughly the same age but
with many more years of service than
Roberts. One reason presidents look to the
federal appeals courts for justices is that the
judges on those courts are not representing
others but indeed making their own
decisions, which constitute the best evidence
of how the individuals might think about the
law and might perform on the Supreme
Court. Luttig would have come with less
risk simply because, tested for so much
longer, his record is more emphatically that
of someone who practices the approach to
judging Bush says he wants in his Supreme
Court nominees. The extra risk associated
with the Roberts choice might not matter
much if another vacancy occurs in the next
year or two and the president chooses Luttig
or someone like him. But if it turns out that
Bush has only this one opportunity, then the
question of the choice not made could come
back to haunt him-just as the choice of
David Souter, in 1990, has his father.
That helps explain conservative misgivings
about Roberts. These are seldom expressed
publicly-with Ann Coulter the loud
exception. In Roberts's defense, it might be
said that he is surely not oblivious to the
pitched ideological battles of the past two
decades, having lived in Washington all of
that time-he knows what is at stake in the
courts. And, being a lawyer's lawyer, he
could help the Court become more rigorous
in its reasoning. That would be a positive
development.
It's hard to see Roberts writing a weak-as-
water opinion of the sort O'Connor penned
for the Court two years ago in sustaining
admissions preferences at the Michigan Law
School. Likewise it is hard to imagine
Roberts abiding the religion-clause chaos to
which O'Connor made major contributions;
likely he would, like his former boss
Rehnquist, strive for doctrinal clarity. And
it is hard to envision Roberts buying into
such pretensions to supremacy as came from
O'Connor, Souter, and Anthony Kennedy in
their dismaying joint opinion in Planned
Parenihood v. Casey. At the same time, it is
easy to imagine Roberts-who has advised
an attorney general and a president, and
argued the executive's position in the
Supreme Court-being especially aware of
the importance of the executive power, at a
time when terrorists still threaten America
and the world.
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In short, John G. Roberts may prove an
excellent choice. To say that time will tell
is, of course, a clich6. But with a nominee
for the Supreme Court, it always does.
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"In Search of John Roberts"
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July 21, 2005
Jeffrey Rosen
Here is what liberals and conservatives can
agree on about John Roberts, President
Bush's first Supreme Court nominee: He is
perhaps the most impressive Supreme Court
advocate of his generation, extremely
intelligent, thoughtful and able-a lawyer's
lawyer. In a reasonable world, that should
be enough to assure his confirmation with
bipartisan enthusiasm. Unfortunately,
Washington politics is anything but
reasonable.
Judge Roberts takes pride in representing
both sides of the political spectrum. He
delighted environmental groups by
convincing the Supreme Court that a freeze
on development in an unspoiled part of Lake
Tahoe didn't violate the private property
rights of the affected landowners. He has
argued for and against the constitutionality
of affirmative action. For Mr. Roberts, the
ability to "argue a case round or argue it
flat," as the lawyers say, is a point of pride.
As both an appellate lawyer and an appellate
judge, he earned the reputation of a legal
craftsman who didn't come to cases with
preconceived grand theories, but took
positions based on the arguments and legal
materials in each case.
Judge Roberts is, by all accounts, a very nice
man: funny, humble and decent. He treats
judges and litigants with a Jimmy Stewart-
like courtesy. He sends notes to associates
whose children are sick. His winning
personality has raised the hopes of
conservatives who understand that the most
influential justices are those who work well
with their colleagues.
But here is where conservatives and liberals
may part company about John Roberts:
Conservatives hope he will be a William
Brennan of the right, using his intelligence
and charm on behalf of his deeply
conservative views to move the court far to
the right of where it was under the moderate
influence of Justice Sandra Day O'Connor;
liberals fear that conservatives are correct.
Liberals worry that a Justice Roberts might
take a narrow view of Congress's power to
regulate the economy that would impose
severe limitations on the regulatory state.
And they fear that he would vote to overturn
Roe v. Wade, because in 1990, when he was
a deputy solicitor general, he signed a brief
in an abortion-financing case that included a
footnote calling for Roe to be overturned.
How can the Senate cast light on the
question of whether Judge Roberts is a
conservative ideologue with an agenda to
transform the law or a conservative
incrementalist who may surprise liberals and
conservatives alike with his independence?
To begin with, senators should forget about
the government briefs Mr. Roberts signed
about Roe v. Wade, school prayer and other
hot button issues. It's clearly not fair to hold
him accountable for defending the George
H.W. Bush administration's official
positions. After all, that was, at the time, his
job.
Instead, the Senate should explore Judge
Roberts's judicial philosophy and
temperament. He has been on the appellate
court for only two years, however, so clues
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in his judicial record are necessarily sparse.
But based on his record throughout his
career, he does not appear to be a rigid
Constitutional "originalist" in the tradition of
Justices Antonin Scalia and Clarence
Thomas. These men believe that the
Constitution should be strictly interpreted in
light of its original understanding; they are
willing (to different degrees) to overturn
years of Supreme Court precedents in the
name of constitutional fidelity.
Having spent decades arguing before courts
rather than sitting on them, John Roberts has
never embraced one grand legal theory to
the exclusion of all others. On the contrary,
he has been trained to cast a wide net in
order to reach a convincing result.
Inflexible originalism is a theory embraced
by academics and crusaders, not practicing
lawyers who must persuade judges of
different stripes.
At the same time, Judge Roberts is not a
former legislator-as was Justice
O'Connor-and therefore he is not likely to
be as willing to split every difference
between liberals and conservatives. As an
appellate lawyer forced to apply legal
precedents, he was trained to believe that
judges should provide clear answers to legal
questions rather than keeping the country
guessing.
So, are conservatives right to hope, and
liberals right to fear, that as a justice, he
would vote to overturn many of the 5-4
cases where Justice O'Connor sided with her
more liberal colleagues? The best way for
the senators to find an answer to this
question is to explore Judge Roberts's view
of precedents, which the lawyers call stare
decisis, or "let the decision stand."
In the confirmation hearings for his
appellate judgeship, Mr. Roberts said he was
bound to apply the Supreme Court's
precedents. That was a good answer at the
time, but it is no longer terribly relevant: as
a Supreme Court justice, he would be free to
overturn the court's earlier rulings. Would
he read precedents broadly or narrowly?
And under what circumstances might he
vote to uphold precedents with which he
disagrees?
The truth is that Judge Roberts probably
doesn't have a well-thought-out theory of
stare decisis. As an appellate lawyer and
judge, he had no need or occasion to
develop one.
In fact, very few Supreme Court justices
have developed a theory of stare decisis that
is entirely satisfying. At one extreme there
is Justice Thomas, who, according to his
colleague Justice Scalia, is willing to
overturn any precedent he thinks is
inconsistent with the original understanding
of the Constitution. At another extreme
have been justices like John Marshall
Harlan, who, in the name of judicial
continuity, are very reluctant to overturn
precedents, even those with which they
disagree.
Perhaps one clue to Judge Roberts's leanings
on the force of precedents can be found in
the outlook of one of his judicial heroes,
Henry Friendly, an appellate judge for
whom he became a clerk in 1979. Friendly
was famously cautious, a man devoted to
incremental rather than radical legal change.
It might be illuminating for the senators to
ask Judge Roberts what he admired about
Friendly, and why.
Another potentially fruitful line of
questioning might center on Judge Roberts's
views about the scope of Congress's power
to regulate the environment and the
economy.
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As an appellate judge, his record on this
crucial issue has been indistinct. In one
case, he took an expansive view of
Congress's power to condition the receipt of
public funds on an agency's promise not to
discriminate. In another, he took a much
more restrictive view of Congress's power to
regulate the environment. Some of his
comments suggest that he thinks the court is
correct to strike down federal laws on rare
occasions, but that he may be unlikely to try
to resurrect what some conservatives call
"the Constitution in exile," overturning
decades of precedents and dismantling the
regulatory state root and branch.
While it is appropriate for senators to ask
Judge Roberts about specific cases, they
might get him to reveal more of himself if
they asked him about his vision of the role
of the courts in democracy. When I
interviewed him three years ago, I was
impressed with his reverence for the law as
something distinct from politics, his belief
that courts should operate according to
independent ideals of professionalism and
neutrality, and, most of all, his apparent lack
of anger, which sometimes mars the
opinions of Justices Scalia and Thomas.
If his confirmation hearings confirm this
impression, Judge Roberts may prove to be
not only a great justice, but one whom
principled liberals can embrace with
gratitude and relief.
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